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Lisa K Bork ***
I. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
A. ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY FORFEITURE PROVISIONS OF TEXAS
CLEAN AIR ACT, TEXAS SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT, AND
TEXAS WATER QUALITY ACT VIOLATE THE OPEN
COURTS PROVISION OF TEXAS
CONSTITUTION
1. Background
N Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control BoardI the civil
penalty provisions of the Texas Clean Air Act (TCAA), the Texas Solid
Waste Disposal Act (TSWDA), and the Texas Water Code (Water
Code) were at issue. Pursuant to these statutes, the Texas Air Control
Board and the Texas Water Commission have the power to directly assess
civil penalties, without court approval, of up to $10,000 per day for each
violation.2 The statutes provide that subsequent to the assessment of a pen-
alty, the offender must either: (1) pay the penalty, or (2) make a cash deposit
or file a supersedeas bond pending suit in district court.3 Failure to make
the cash deposit or file the bond would result in forfeiture of the offender's
rights to judicial review. 4
Plaintiff Texas Association of Business (TAB) is a not-for-profit corpora-
tion whose members do business throughout Texas. Claiming that some of
its members had been assessed civil penalties by either the Texas Air Control
Board (TACB) or the Texas Water Commission (TWC),5 and that the rest
* B.A., University of Oklahoma with Highest Honors, 1984, J.D., Harvard Law School,
1987 cum laude. Shareholder, Thompson & Knight, P.C., Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., George Washington University; M.A., Ph.D., State University of New York at
Buffalo; J.D., University of Texas School of Law with honors. Associate, Thompson &
Knight, P.C., Austin, Texas.
*** B.S., Stanford University; J.D., University of Texas School of Law with honors. As-
sociate, Thompson & Knight, P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993).
2. Id. at 442 (citations omitted).
3. Id. at 443 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.089(a), (b) (TCAA);
§ 361.252(k), (1) (Vernon 1992) (TSWDA); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.136(j) (Vernon
1988)).
4. Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.252(m) (TSWDA);
382.089(c) (Vernon 1992) (TCAA); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.136(k) (Vernon 1988)).




of its members that are subject to the TCAA, Water Code, or TSWDA were
at "substantial risk" of being assessed civil penalties, the TAB sued on behalf
of its members. Filing under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,6 the
TAB claimed that the civil penalty provisions of the TCAA, Water Code,
and TSWDA, and any rules or orders issued thereunder, were facially
unconstitutional.
2. Standing
The Texas Supreme Court began its analysis by considering whether the
TAB had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes and regu-
lations. The court explained that allowing a party without standing to sue
would violate the separation of powers doctrine of the federal and Texas
constitutions 7 as well as the open courts provision of the Texas
Constitution. 8
Contrary to both parties' arguments, the court held that standing cannot
be waived by the parties. 9 The court first stated that standing is a compo-
nent of subject matter jurisdiction. 10 Since subject matter jurisdiction is
non-waivable, standing also cannot be waived and may be raised for the first
time on appeal by the parties or the court. I I In this case, the court raised the
standing issue for the first time on appeal.
The primary standing issue in this case was whether the TAB, as an or-
ganization of businesses, had standing to sue on behalf of those businesses.
Since Texas had no test for organizational standing, the Texas Supreme
Court adopted the federal standard, holding that an association has standing
to sue when: "(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organiza-
tion's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit."' 2 Applying
the federal Hunt test, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the TAB had
standing to pursue the case. 13
3. Open Courts
The TAB's first major contention was that the statutes and regulations at
6. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001-37.011 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993).
7. The court found that the separation of powers doctrine limits the courts' jurisdiction
in that it prohibits courts from issuing advisory opinions, an executive branch function. Any
opinion rendered in a case brought by a party without standing is advisory because it does not
address an actual or imminent harm. Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 444 (citing TEX.
CONST. art. II, § 1) (other citations omitted).
8. Id. (finding that "standing is implicit in the open courts provision, which contem-
plates access to the courts only for those litigants suffering an injury.") (citing TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 13).
9. Id. at 445.
10. Id.
11. Id. (overruling Texas Indus. Traffic League v. Railroad Comm'n, 633 S.W.2d 821
(Tex. 1982) (per curiam)).
12. Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 447 (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple




issue violated the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. The chal-
lenged statutes and regulations provided that subsequent to the assessment
of a penalty, and in lieu of paying the penalty, the offender must either
tender a cash deposit or post a supersedeas bond within 30 days. If neither
option is taken, the offender would forfeit his right to judicial review.14 The
court explained that one of the three guarantees of the open courts provision
applied here: citizens must have access to courts without having to encoun-
ter unreasonable financial barriers. 15 In analyzing this issue, the court
viewed the reasonableness of the deposit/bond requirement in light of (1) the
state interest involved and (2) the barrier the payment posed to access to the
courts. 16
The state argued that the penalty provisions furthered the state interest of
protecting Texas' natural resources by increasing the deterrent effect of the
penalties and by aiding in their collection. The court agreed that the imme-
diate payment component of the penalty requirement did further the state's
interest and did not implicate the open courts provision. 17 However, the
court found that the statutory component providing for forfeiture of appeal
rights upon nonpayment was "an unreasonable restriction on access to
courts."' 18 The court reasoned that the forfeiture provision added no addi-
tional incentive for payment beyond that provided by the provision requiring
payment to stay enforcement. 19 The court stated that the state could "ac-
complish its goals by enforcing the prepayment requirements" alone.20 The
court also pointed out that this scheme would be in accordance with the
appeals procedure normally used in Texas cases. 21
It is important to note that the court did not strike down the provisions
dealing with penalty assessment and collection by the agencies. The court
held only that it is unconstitutional to condition judicial review on the pay-
ment of the penalty or posting of bond. 22
4. Jury Trial
The TAB also argued that the statutes and regulations allowing the agen-
cies to assess civil penalties violated the right to a jury trial guaranteed by
the Texas Constitution.23 Specifically, the TAB argued that the lack of a
14. See supra notes 3 and 4.
15. Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 448 (citing LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335,
342 (Tex. 1986)).
16. Id. at 449.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 450.
19. Id.
20. Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 450.
21. Id. at 449.
22. Id. at 449, 450 n.17.
23. The Texas Constitution provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.
The Legislature shall pass such laws as may be needed to regulate the same, and to maintain its
purity and efficiency." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15. The court did not discuss the TAB's claim
that the lack of a jury trial before the agency violated the Texas Constitution, as the court
claimed that this issue had been decided before. Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 449,
450 n.19 (stating that trial by jury cannot be claimed "with respect to proceedings before an
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trial de novo, as well as the lack of a jury trial before the agency, violated the
Texas Constitution.
The court stated that the right to a jury trial is guaranteed by the Texas
Constitution only for those types of cases tried to a jury at the time of the
adoption of the 1876 Texas Constitution.24 The court found that the agen-
cies' assessments of environmental penalties were not analogous to any type
of action tried in 1876, as the current environmental statutes are relatively
new on the legal scene. 25 No similar governmental schemes existed in 1876.
Because of this fact, the court held that "no right to a jury trial attaches to
appeals from administrative adjudications under the environmental statutes
and regulations at issue here."'26
5. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Doggett dissented from "today's manipulation of the law to para-
lyze anti-pollution efforts tragically announced at a time when protecting the
quality of the air we breathe and the water we drink is so critical."' 27 He
argued that the opinion opened up a watershed of problems in a wide range
of areas, including tax collection and nursing home laws. 28 He further said
that the majority's opinion left a question as to whether the penalties that the
agencies have collected over the years must be returned. 29 However, the
majority specifically said, albeit in a footnote, that this would not be the
case.
30
Justice Doggett strongly disagreed with the majority's determination that
the challenged forfeiture provisions violated the Texas open courts provi-
sion. He believed that the State met its burden of showing a compelling
interest in employing administrative penalties because the protection of nat-
ural resources is constitutionally mandated. 31 He found that the judicial re-
view forfeiture provision was not unreasonable, as the penalty usage is
"substantially limited" by provisions of the TCAA, TSWDA, and the Water
Code.32 He thought that the majority's opinion would serve as a green light
for unscrupulous polluters to get out of any imposed punishment or to avoid
remedying the damage they have caused, allowing a "perhaps deliberately
undercapitalized corporation" to declare bankruptcy during pendency of
suit, thereby escaping any responsibility to remedy damage.33
Justice Doggett pointed out that time and resources would limit the
State's ability to initiate and pursue an enforcement action to collect any
administrative board") (citing Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 185 S.W. 556, 561-62
(1916)).
24. Id. at 450 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 451.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 453 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
28. Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 453.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 450 n.17.
31. Id. at 455 (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a)).
32. Id. at 456.
33. Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 456.
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penalties assessed that are not paid within the prescribed time.34 He also
claimed that the majority had not shown any evidence suggesting a restric-
tive effect, caused by the forfeiture provision, on access to the courts. He
went on to say that "[w]hile the enormity of some future penalty could in
fact unconstitutionally bar judicial access, that is certainly not the case
here."' 35 He criticized the majority for according "our state's largest busi-
nesses the same treatment as indigents in avoiding financial responsibility for
court and other litigation costs," 36 and he was concerned with the far-reach-
ing effect the majority's decision would have with respect to similar provi-
sions in non-environmental statutes. 37
Justice Doggett also took issue with "the severe blow struck against our
fundamental right of trial by jury."' 38 While he ultimately found that the
TAB was not entitled to a jury trial in this case, Justice Doggett was dis-
turbed by the majority's broad language and refusal to clearly mark the
boundaries of its denial of a jury trial for administrative proceedings. 39 Af-
ter going into some depth about the "central role of the jury as a democratic
institution, '"40 he found that the majority had seriously misconstrued the
jury trial standard. 4 1 He pointed to early anti-pollution laws as evidence
that an analogous cause of action with a right to jury trial has existed for
over a century.4 2 He insisted that the majority was attaching too much im-
portance to the form, rather than substance, of the cause of action, and that
the majority wrongly gave too much weight to the fact that the administra-
tive state was not yet created in 1876. 43 He found the "wholesale transfer of
authority for fact-finding from juries to the bureaucracy" to be "offensive"
to the rights guaranteed by the Texas Constitution."
Justice Doggett also argued that the right to a jury trial is broader than
the majority claimed, as article V, section 10 of the Texas Constitution does
not limit the right to jury trial to causes in existence in 1876. 45 He believed
that there should be only narrow exceptions to the right to a trial by jury,
34. Id.
35. Id. at 457.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 457-58. For example, Justice Doggett pointed to similar provisions in the stat-
ute protecting residents in nursing homes. Id. at 457-58 & n.12 (citing TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.066 (administrative penalty for statutory violations); § 242.069
(Vernon 1992) (prepayment of penalty required before judicial review)).
Justice Doggett also pointed to the criminal law requirements for the forfeiture of vehicles
and other property alleged to have been used in violating criminal laws (e.g., assets from drug
dealers which could otherwise finance their defense). Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at
458-59.
38. Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 459 (referring to the majority's determination
that the penalty provisions did not violate the right to a jury trial).
39. Id. at 466-67.
40. Id. at 459-60.
41. Id. at 461.
42. Id. at 461-62 (pointing to common law nuisance claims and criminal pollution laws).
43. Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 463.
44. Id. at 464.
45. Id. at 465 (citing State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex.
1975)). The majority did not discuss the implications of this right to jury trial provision,
focusing only on Article I, section 15 of the Texas Constitution.
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with the only one in the administrative proceedings area being where the
state is enforcing a regulation or statute protecting the public. 46 In his view,
the TAB was not entitled to a jury trial because the state was protecting the
public by imposing administrative penalties pursuant to public regulations. 47
Finally, Justice Doggett derided the majority for even considering the
standing issue when neither of the sides in the litigation disputed the TAB's
standing.48 He claimed that the majority merely wanted to "close access to
our courts to those citizens who choose to challenge environmental degrada-
tion, neighborhood destruction and consumer abuse."'49
B. CORPORATE OFFICERS AND PLANT MANAGERS MAY BE HELD
PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR CORPORATE VIOLATIONS OF TEXAS
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IF THEY PARTICIPATE IN
OR DIRECT SUCH ACTIVITY
Setting precedent for corporate officer and supervisor liability under Texas
environmental laws, the Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Dis-
trict upheld a trial court's judgment holding the president and plant man-
ager liable for violations of the company's environmental permit. 50 The
violations in this case were egregious and intentional. Current and former
employees testified that they covertly pumped sludge into a pit despite the
Texas Water Commission's and its predecessor agency's actions prohibiting
the pit's use and requiring closure. 5'
On appeal the company officials argued they could not be held personally
liable because they did not own the permit that was violated. The defend-
ants relied upon a case concluding that liability could not be imposed on an
individual where a corporation engaged in usury. 52 However, the court in
Malone Services distinguished that case where a violation of the usury statute
was considered contractual in nature while the violation of an environmental
statute more resembled a tort.53 Under tort law in Texas, "a corporate of-
ficer who participates in or directs the commission of a tort may be held
personally liable."' 54 In support of this conclusion, the court cited several
federal cases reaching a similar result, even though the corporate officials
46. Id. at 466.
47. Id.
48. Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 467. Justice Doggett further argued that the
standing issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal - by anyone. Id. at 468 (citing
Texas Indus. Traffic League v. Railroad Comm'n of Tex., 633 S.W.2d 821, 822-23 (Tex.
1982)). Justice Doggett claimed that to reach the majority's result, it must overrule six Texas
Supreme Court cases. Id.
49. Id. at 467.
50. State v. Malone Services Co., 853 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993,
writ denied). The trial court had awarded the State over $3 million in penalties against Ma-
lone Service Company and the two company officials.
51. Id. at 84.
52. Id. at 85 (citing Wartman v. Empire Loan Co., 101 S.W. 499 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1909, no writ).
53. Id.
54. Malone Services, 853 S.W.2d at 85 (emphasis added).
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were not "permit holders."'55
In addition to their challenge of personal liability, the defendants appealed
the decision on several other largely evidentiary grounds. The appellate
court rejected these arguments as well. 56 First, the defendants contended
that no or insufficient evidence was introduced to show the earthen pit was
unlawfully used on 417 occasions. However, the court cited numerous ex-
amples of oral or written evidence of these violations to justify its finding.57
Second, the defendants argued that no evidence existed to prove 360 of the
violations because the facility was permitted for on-site storage of hazardous
waste until a specific date. The court concluded the on-site exclusion would
not apply because (1) wastes generated off-site were mixed with those gener-
ated on-site, (2) the jury found, and the evidence supported, that more than
on-site storage processing or disposal occurred, and (3) other permits "ex-
plicitly prohibited continued use of the earthen pit."' 58 In another eviden-
tiary point, the defendants challenged the jury's finding that old waste was
discharged into groundwater for 3,495 days. On this point, the court upheld
the jury's decision largely because a state expert testified continual contami-
nation was occurring and also because the defendants' expert testified
groundwater contamination probably existed as early as 1982.59
The court's holding on this point of error could prove damaging to de-
fendants in groundwater contamination cases and perhaps other cases where
direct evidence of a release, discharge, or emission is not possible due to
physical limitations. In such cases "in which subsurface discharge is not
readily substantiated by direct observation," the court concluded "the jury
could reasonably infer continual seepage in lieu of credible evidence of a
force or event that would have stopped the seepage." 6°
The amount of the penalties was challenged as well. The defendants asked
the appellate court to overturn the award of over $3,000,000 by the trial
court, arguing the award was excessive. The court dismissed the defendant's
arguments by stating, "[a]ssessing the maximum penalty against [the defend-
ants] cannot be considered extreme in light of blatant conduct."'61 An exam-
ple of this "blatant conduct" cited was "that [the defendants] knew it was
unlawful and unsound to pump into the pit, yet company policy authorized




58. Malone Services, 853 S.W.2d at 84.
59. Id. at 85-86.





C. SUPREME COURT APPLIES "LOCALITY NORMALITY" TEST TO
DETERMINE WHETHER HUMAN INVOLVEMENT NEGATES THE
NATURAL PROCESS EXEMPTION UNDER THE TEXAS
CLEAN AIR ACT
In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Texas, the justices struggled
with the sublime issue of when the odor of the bovine digestion process is
"natural" and when human involvement in this process reaches a point that
it becomes "unnatural. '63 This classification determines the jurisdiction of
the state's air pollution control agency, in this case the Texas Air Control
Board (TACB), now the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commis-
sion, to issue a permit to regulate the natural odors or "pollutants.' 64
The Supreme Court of Texas adopted two prior decisions by the courts of
appeals in Dallas and Tyler.65 The rule of law established in those two cases
prohibited TACB permitting on a cattle or agricultural operation if it is "one
that occurs in nature and is affected or controlled by human devices only to
an extent normal and usual for the particular area involved."' 66 The Texas
Clean Air Act provides that the State can regulate "air contaminants,"
which includes odors that are "produced by processes other than natural. '67
The Supreme Court was concerned that adopting a literal reading of the
statute would exempt all agricultural activities in contravention of the term
"natural" in the statute's purpose, while the state's position that any human
involvement means a process cannot be natural would unduly expand the
jurisdiction of the statute. 68 The court's proffered solution engaged the loca-
tion normality standard first enunciated in Europak.69
The court concluded application of this standard was a factual rather than
a legal exercise.70 The court of appeals, in applying the Europak and South-
west Livestock standard, ruled as a matter of law the F/R feeding lot was not
a natural process regardless of where located. 7 1 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed with this ruling and remanded the case to the court of appeals for
review of the sufficiency of the trial court's factual findings. 72 The Supreme
Court noted that some evidence existed in the record "that F/R's use is
consistent with similar operations in the area."'73
Rejecting the majority of the court's decision, as well as those of the Dal-
las and Tyler courts of appeals in Europak and Southwest Livestock, Justice
Spector wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Gammage and Dog-
63. F/R Cattle Co. v. State, 866 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1993).
64. Id. at 202 n.2.
65. Europak, Inc. v. County of Hunt, 507 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no
writ); Southwest Livestock and Trucking Co. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 579 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. FIR Cattle, 866 S.W.2d at 204 (quoting Europak, 507 S.W.2d at 891).
67. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.003(2) (Vernon 1992).
68. FIR Cattle, 866 S.W.2d at 204.
69. Id.






gett. Justice Spector criticized the majority for ignoring proper standards of
literal statutory interpretation and laboring to find unwritten exceptions and
undisclosed intentions in the Texas Clean Air Act.74 Under the dissent's
approach, location would have nothing to do with determining whether a
process is "natural. ' 75 "The only role that location plays under the Clean
Air Act is the determination of remedies - a function that the legislature
deliberately assigned to the Board, subject only to limited review in court." 76
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority for establishing "a nonsensical
approach to environmental protection: as the air quality deteriorates, so does
the Board's jurisdiction [under the Texas Clean Air Act]."' 77
Both the majority and dissent failed to recognize another absurd result of
the Europak, Southwest Livestock, and now the F/R Cattle standard: the
more human involvement in natural processes, that is, the more humans
concentrate cattle and create odors, the more natural the process becomes.
Surely, this is not what the legislature intended. The Supreme Court appears
to have adopted a standard that has no foundation in the statute and cer-
tainly no basis in common sense.
D. PERMIT APPLICANT MUST EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
BEFORE SEEKING JUDICIAL REVIEW
In Texas Water Commission v. Dellana78 the Supreme Court of Texas
refused to exempt a private party from the well-established rule of adminis-
trative law requiring all administrative remedies be exhausted before seeking
judicial review. 79 The court conditionally granted the TWC's writ of man-
damus and ordered the district court to vacate its order requiring the TWC
staff officers to appear at depositions. 80 The court held that the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to circumvent the exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement before proceeding with judicial
review."'
1. Background
The plaintiff Hunter Industrial Facilities (Hunter) submitted an applica-
tion "for permission to receive, process, and store hazardous and nonhazard-
ous waste in this state."'8 2 In November of 1991, Hunter filed suit in district
court alleging that the TWC was delaying the processing of Hunter's appli-
cation. On January 28, 1993, the TWC denied Hunter's application, issuing
its final written order on January 29, 1993. On February 3, 1993, Hunter
amended its petition in the district court, alleging that the TWC's denial of
74. F/R Cattle, 866 S.W.2d at 207 (Spector, J. dissenting).
75. Id. at 208.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 209.
78. Texas Water Comm'n v. Dellana, 849 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1993).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 810.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 809.
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its application was arbitrary and capricious, was contrary to the evidence,
denied Hunter its civil rights, and resulted from procedural irregularities.
Hunter also served nine TWC staff members with deposition notices. At a
hearing in the district court, Hunter argued that the depositions were neces-
sary in order to provide evidentiary support for Hunter's motion for rehear-
ing, which was to be filed with the TWC by February 17, 1993. The trial
court ordered the staff members to appear at the depositions by February 13,
1993. The TWC then filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Texas
Supreme Court, requesting it to vacate the district court's order.
2. Analysis
The TWC argued to the Texas Supreme Court that Hunter had impermis-
sibly bypassed the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement in
seeking judicial intervention in the district court. Hunter argued that such
judicial review was proper because Hunter was irreparably harmed by the
TWC's actions. Hunter further contended that the discovery granted by the
trial court was necessary in order for Hunter to preserve error for its antici-
pated appeal. Hunter based this claim on its fear that any complaints not
fully presented to the agency might be deemed to be waived for purposes of
any appeal to the courts.
The general rule regarding the appeal of agency decisions is that a party
may only seek judicial review if it has exhausted all available administrative
remedies. 83 A party must file a motion for rehearing before it can be deemed
to have exhausted all its remedies. 8 4 The court found that Hunter could not
seek judicial review before obtaining a final agency decision on its matter. 85
The court dismissed Hunter's argument that its complaints might be
deemed waived if it did not set forth enough detail in its motion for rehear-
ing. First, the court said that the motion for rehearing need only be "suffi-
ciently definite to apprise the regulatory agency of the error claimed."
86
Next, the court said that the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register
Act 87 permits the reviewing court to go beyond the administrative record
when reviewing the case. 88 The court concluded that the trial court had
abused its discretion by allowing the discovery and by allowing Hunter to
circumvent the exhaustion of remedies requirement. 89
83. Dellana, 849 S.W.2d at 810 (citing City of Sherman v. Public Util. Comm'n, 643
S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. 1983)).
84. Id. (citing TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a. §§ 19(e)(1)-(6) (Supp. 1993)).
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Suburban Util. Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 652 S.W.2d 358, 365 (Tex.
1983)).
87. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon 1987 and Supp. 1993).
88. Dellana, 849 S.W.2d at 810 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a,




E. DETERMINATION BY TWC THAT A PARTY IS A POTENTIALLY
RESPONSIBLE PERSON UNDER THE TSWDA CONSTITUTES
"DECISION OR OTHER ACT OF THE AGENCY,"
WHICH MAY ONLY BE CHALLENGED IN
TRAVIS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
The main issue in Texas Water Commission v. Lindsey 90 was whether the
plaintiffs, who were contesting their classification by the TWC as a poten-
tially responsible person (PRP) under the TSWDA, were challenging an
agency action or were merely attacking the constitutionality of a statute.
The court's findings on this issue determined whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to hear the case.
Following the abatement of an appeal by the appeals court9' and the sub-
sequent declaration by the Jasper County District Court of the rights of the
parties on all issues, the appeals court finally determined that the main
thrust of the case involved a challenge by the plaintiffs to the application of
legislation by the TWC.92 Because an agency action was involved, the court
found that venue was proper only in Travis County District Court pursuant
to the TSWDA.93 The appeals court directed that the trial court dismiss the
case for want of jurisdiction and that any further action be brought in Travis
County.94
1. Background
The plaintiffs in this case were three individuals who had purchased a
tract of land in Lufkin, Texas from a creosoting company. They owned the
land for only a few months before selling it in 1975. In September of 1990,
the plaintiffs received notice that the land they previously owned was being
proposed by the TWC for listing on the "state registry." 95 The notice fur-
ther designated the plaintiffs as "potentially responsible persons."'96 Follow-
ing initiation of the suit, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment
in the trial court, arguing that 68 provisions of the TSWDA 97 were unconsti-
tutional. 98 The trial court struck down 63 of the statutory provisions,99 find-
90. Texas Water Comm'n v. Lindsey, 850 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992); 855
S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied).
91. 850 S.W.2d at 189 (Lindsey I).
92. 855 S.W.2d at 752 (Lindsey II).
93. Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.321 (Vernon 1992)).
94. Id. at 753.
95. The state registry identifies "to the extent feasible, each facility that may constitute an
imminent and substantial endangerment to public health and safety or the environment due to
a release or threatened release of hazardous substances into the environment." TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.181(a) (Vernon 1992).
96. 855 S.W.2d at 752 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.271 (Vernon
1992)).
97. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. Ch. 361 (Vernon 1992).
98. Plaintiffs argued that sections 361.181 through 361.405 were unconstitutional, though
plaintiffs evidently made very generalized claims of unconstitutionality.
99. Those sections declared unconstitutional by the trial court were sections 361.181
through 361.345 of the Texas Health & Safety Code. Lindsey, 850 S.W.2d at 184.
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ing that they violated the Texas and United States Constitutions.t°° Because
the lower court did not give specific grounds for finding these provisions
unconstitutional, the appellate court abated the appeal, ordering the trial
court to "render judgment declaring the right of the parties on all
matters."' 0 '
The appellate court in Lindsey I also spent a fair amount of time discuss-
ing jurisdictional issues raised by the TWC. The TWC argued that the
TSWDA set venue in Travis County, Texas10 2 because the disputed issue
involved an appeal of actions taken by the TWC. The appellate court re-
jected the TWC's argument, finding that the disputed issue was merely the
constitutionality of the statute provisions, not the applicability or validity of
an agency rule.'0 3 Thus, the appellate court reasoned, the general residuary
clause of the Texas Constitution'0 gave the Jasper County District Court
jurisdiction over the case.' 0 5 Finally, the court found that the Declaratory
Judgments Act provided a remedy for the plaintiffs to attack the constitu-
tionality of the statutory provisions.' 0 6
Following abatement by the appellate court, the trial court issued a Final
Declaratory Judgment setting forth a more reasoned analysis as to why it
found the TSWDA provisions unconstitutional. Specifically, the trial court
found that the relevant provisions violated the plaintiffs' rights of due pro-
cess and due course of law under the Texas Constitution because: (1) the
plaintiffs were not given notice prior to the TWC's determination that they
were "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs) for a state Superfund site, and
(2) this determination imposed upon the plaintiffs duties and liability for
costs that already had been incurred and accrued. 10 7
2. Analysis
Following the trial court's determinations, the main issue for the appeals
court in Lindsey II was whether the case was tried in the proper court. This
in turn depended on the exact nature of the plaintiffs' complaint. Based on
the findings set forth in the Declaratory Judgment, the appeals court decided
that the basic complaint went directly to the TWC's determination that the
plaintiffs were PRP's. 0 8 Finding this complaint to be a clear attack upon "a
100. Id. at 184-85.
101. Id. at 189.
102. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.321 (Vernon 1992). This section pro-
vides that "[a] person affected by a ruling, order, decision, or other act of the department or
the commission may appeal the action by filing a petition in the district court of Travis
County." Id.
103. Lindsey, 850 S.W.2d at 188.
104. TEX. CONST. art V, § 8 provides in part: "District Court jurisdiction consists of ex-
clusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except
where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or
other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body."
105. Lindsey, 850 S.W.2d at 188.
106. Id.
107. Lindsey, 855 S.W.2d at 751 (citing the district court's Final Declaratory Judgment of
Oct. 28, 1992).
108. Id. at 752.
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decision or other act of the Agency," 9 the court held that jurisdiction lay
exclusively in Travis County pursuant to the TSWDA."°
The TSWDA provides the sole avenue for appealing an agency decision
made pursuant to the TSWDA: "[t]here is no power in a district court to
review an administrative decision unless a proper statute vests special juris-
diction in that particular district court to review administrative deci-
sions." '' The TSWDA vests such special jurisdiction in Travis County." 12
The court did not overrule the holding in its earlier opinion that jurisdiction
would be proper in Jasper County if the action were merely brought pursu-
ant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.' 3 Thus, if the only issue
had been whether certain provisions of the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act
were constitutional, suit in Jasper County would not have been improper.
F. LESSEE RECOVERS UNDER FRAUD CLAIM FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES
In Holmes v. P.K Pipe & Tubing, Inc. 14 the First District Court of Ap-
peals in Houston allowed an award of environmentally-related damages
under a fraud claim but upheld denial of several other claims." 15 This case
provides important precedent to those parties seeking to recover environ-
mental cleanup costs from prior owners of contaminated property.
1. Background
In 1981, Alton D. Holmes purchased a tract of land, part of which Rohm
and Haas Texas Incorporated (Rohm and Haas) had used for disposal of
methyl methacrylate tar residue during the 1960s. Holmes knew before he
purchased the property that waste had been disposed there and had previ-
ously been the subject of a lawsuit because of failure to disclose the waste
disposal between prior owners. In 1983, the Texas Department of Water
Resources entered a compliance agreement by which closure, post-closure,
and recordation of the location of the waste disposal area in the deed records
would be performed. The closure completed by Rohm and Haas entailed
construction of a landfill into which all of the wastes were placed, capping of
the cell with six inches of clay, and installation of final cover, erosion protec-
tion, leachate control, waste seepage control, and groundwater monitoring
wells.
In 1984, Holmes, who still retained ownership of part of the contaminated
property, leased it to Tenneco Gas Pipeline Company (Tenneco). Holmes
and Tenneco disagreed over whether Holmes had disclosed existence of the
waste disposal area and showed the company the compliance agreement.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 753.
111. Id. (citing Stone v. Texas Liquor Control Bd., 417 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1967)).
112. Id.
113. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004 (Vernon 1986).
114. 856 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1993, n.w.h.).
115. Id. at 532.
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Holmes recorded the location of the waste in the deed records the day after
he received lease payments from Tenneco. A few months later in 1984, Ten-
neco sold the pipe it had stored on the site to P.K. Pipe & Tubing, Inc. (P.K.
Pipe). P.K. Pipe then leased the property from Holmes. P.K. Pipe claimed
that Holmes never disclosed the waste disposal site, and although he pointed
out the monitoring wells, he did not explain their purpose.
Several weeks after signing the lease, Holmes began sending P.K. Pipe
copies of letters to the Texas Water Commission from an attorney represent-
ing Rohm and Haas. These letters asserted storage of pipe over the waste
cell threatened its cover and caused waste to ooze into the drainage ditch.
Nonetheless, P.K. Pipe extended its lease of the property. Eventually, hav-
ing met with the TWC, P.K. Pipe removed the pipe over the waste cell and
restored the cover to its original condition.
P.K. Pipe then terminated its lease and later filed suit against Holmes.
P.K. Pipe alleged breach of the lease agreement, misrepresentation, and vio-
lation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), premised upon
failure to disclose the waste disposal cell under the pipe. P.K. Pipe was
awarded approximately $61,000 by the trial court, including about $3,000 in
exemplary damages.
2. Statutes of Limitations
The court of appeals considered Holmes' points of error on expiration of
statutes of limitations. P.K. Pipe's claims under the DTPA, which included
the claim for breach of implied warranty, 1 6 were barred by the applicable
two-year limitations period." 7 The court rejected P.K. Pipe's assertion that
its cause of action did not accrue until it incurred or learned it would incur
damages," 18 concluding rather that such claims arise when a plaintiff discov-
ered or should have discovered, with reasonable due diligence, a concealed
deceptive act or practice." 19
3. Constructive Eviction
P.K. Pipe's claim for constructive eviction survived limitations but ulti-
mately failed. Unlike the claim for breach of implied warranty of suitability,
the claim for breach of warranty of peaceable and quiet enjoyment was
brought separately from the DTPA claim and was not barred by the two-
year statute of limitations.' 20 The court assumed, without deciding, that the
defendant's acts deprived P.K. Pipe of the use and enjoyment of the entire
land.'21 However, because P.K. Pipe did not abandon the property within a
116. Id. at 538-39.
117. Id. at 536-39.
118. Id. at 537 (citing Southwestern Bell Media, Inc. v. Lyles, 825 S.W.2d 488, 492 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied); California Fed. Mortgage Co. v. Street, 824
S.W.2d 622, 633 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied)).
119. P.K Pipe, 856 S.W.2d at 537 (citing California Fed. Mortgage, 824 S.W.2d at 625).




reasonable time, the court found no constructive eviction. 122 In fact, the
plaintiff had extended the lease after discovering the problem. For these rea-
sons, the court of appeals ruled the claim was properly denied. 123
4. Fraud and Misrepresentation
As its last theory of recovery, P.K. Pipe claimed that Holmes engaged in
fraud and misrepresentation. The trial court found that (1) Holmes knew of
the chemical waste on the property, rendering it unsuitable for pipe storage,
(2) a reasonable person would have disclosed this material fact, (3) Holmes
knew of the duty to disclose this fact based upon a prior fraud suit involving
the property based on this same material fact, and (4) his deliberate misrep-
resentation was relied upon by P.K. Pipe to its detriment. 124 The court of
appeals, in upholding the trial court's findings, concluded that if circum-
stances place a duty on a person to disclose a fact and that person remains
silent, "silence is equivalent to a false representation."' 125
Only one of the elements of fraud was challenged--detrimental reli-
ance. 126 Holmes contended P.K. Pipe received constructive notice of the
waste disposal unit based upon its recordation in the court property records
and actual notice based on observation and disclosure of the groundwater
monitoring wells. The court rejected both arguments. First, the court re-
jected the constructive notice motion relying upon a case in which the
supreme court concluded that deed recordation statutes are designed to pro-
tect good faith purchasers from losing title, not perpetrators of fraud. 127
Second, the court concluded P.K. Pipe could not be said to have received
actual notice of the disposal unit by observing the wells because they looked
like recharge wells for the aquifer and were described in the lease only as
"water wells."' 128 The court relied upon a prior decision that concluded ac-
tual notice only includes those facts a reasonable inquiry would have dis-
closed, not circumstances that merely arouse suspicion.' 29
5. Damages
Finally, Holmes challenged the trial court's assessment of damages.
Holmes claimed the lease required P.K. Pipe to incur the costs complained
of because the lease required at the end of its term (1) removal of the pipe,
(2) restoring the property to pre-lease conditions, and (3) compliance with
municipal, state, and federal authorities. The court of appeals held that
damages under a claim of fraud are properly measured by the injury directly
122. Id.
123. Id. at 540-41.
124. P.K. Pipe, 856 S.W.2d at 541.
125. Id. at 541-42.
126. Id. at 542.
127. Id. (citing Ojeda de Toca v. Wise, 748 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1988); ECC Parkway
Joint Venture v. Baldwin, 765 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied)).
128. Id.
129. P.K. Pipe, 856 S.W.2d at 542 (citing University State Bank v. Gifford-Hill Concrete
Corp., 431 S.W.2d 561, 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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and proximately caused by the fraud.130 The court allowed the costs of the
environmental engineer, removal of the pipe from the cap over the waste
unit, and remedying damage to the cap, but denied P.K. Pipe its lease pay-
ments because no loss was occasioned by leasing the property alone. 131 The
court also upheld the award of exemplary damages because the trial court's
factual finding of malice was supported by the evidence presented at trial. 132
G. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE AMBIGUITY OF THE POLLUTION
EXCLUSION IN INSURANCE POLICIES MAY NOT BE GRANTED
BEFORE DISCOVERY IS COMPLETED
In an important decision for parties seeking recovery of environmentally
related damages and/or the costs of defense for such claims from their insur-
ance companies, the First District Court of Appeals in Houston reversed a
district court's granting of summary judgment for several insurance compa-
nies. 133 The insurers argued the pollution exclusion under insurance policies
was not ambiguous and prohibited recovery of damages or costs of defense
for environmental claims.
The plaintiff, CBI Industries (CBI) sued its insurers to obtain coverage for
claims asserted in sixty lawsuits in various Texas courts for personal injury
and property damages allegedly resulting from the release of hydrofluoric
gas into the air. CBI had been engaged by Marathon Petroleum Company
to assist in maintenance and other activities at a Texas City refinery. In
performing this work, CBI's crane tipped and a metallic section of a unit
being refurbished was dropped on a storage tank, releasing a hydrofluoric
acid cloud and allegedly injuring Texas City residents. CBI's insurers de-
nied CBI's claims for insurance coverage for claims arising from the acci-
dent. The insurers apparently relied upon what is known as the pollution
exclusion found in many insurance policies.
CBI filed suit against the insurers in district court because of the denied
claims. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurers. In ob-
jecting to summary judgment, CBI presented its own affidavits and tran-
scripts of testimony before the Texas State Board of Insurance.
The court of appeals reviewed the canons for interpreting insurance poli-
cies established largely by the supreme court. After such review, the court
of appeals concluded that trial courts are to grant summary judgment as a
matter of law where an insurance contract is not ambiguous, that is,
"[w]here the policy is worded such that it can be given only one reasonable
construction."' 134 To the extent an ambiguity exists, it can be classified as
130. Id. at 543.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. CBI Indus., Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 860 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [ist Dist.] 1993, writ requested).
134. Id. at 664 (citing National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d
552, 555 (Tex. 1991); Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. 1987); Puckett
v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. 1984); Yancey v. Floyd West & Co.,
755 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied); Entzminger v. Provident
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one of two types: patent or latent. A patent ambiguity is apparent on the
face of the contract.' 3 5 On the other hand, a latent ambiguity arises when
language is otherwise clear but application of extraneous or collateral facts
makes it in effect unclear or ambiguous.' 36 In such circumstances, parol
evidence and the facts and circumstances under which the agreement was
made may be introduced to ascertain the true intent of the parties. 137
In applying the latent ambiguity rule, the court of appeals ruled CBI
should have been allowed the opportunity of discovery to seek evidence of
any latent ambiguity. 138 The court concluded the Texas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure139 clearly contemplated an opportunity to investigate facts before a
party's suit may be resolved against it. 140 The court did not believe CBI had
been allowed sufficient time to fully conduct discovery because only six
months had elapsed since the suit was filed and the case involved unique and
complex issues.'41 In addition, the insurers had filed a motion for protective
order to preclude discovery by CBI until the summary judgment issue was
decided. 14 2
The inability to discover evidence on the application of the policies to the
subject matter with which they dealt and thereby raise a factual issue on
latent ambiguity, precluded CBI from having the opportunity to develop its
case.' 4 3 The appeals court, citing several statements from documents pro-
duced by CBI that raised questions on the ambiguity of the pollution exclu-
sion, concluded the district court had abused its discretion in not allowing
CBI sufficient discovery opportunity before granting summary judgment. 44
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 14
5
The state's environmental agencies, the Texas Water Commission and the
Texas Air Control Board, were consolidated into the Texas Natural Re-
source Conservation Commission (TNRCC) on September 1, 1993. The
state legislature also met in regular session in 1993, during the survey period.
The following is a summary of the major environmental legislation enacted
into law during this period. 146 Unless otherwise noted, the effective date of
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1983, no
writ)).
135. Id. at 665 (citing Universal Home Builders, Inc. v. Farmer, 375 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, no writ)).
136. Id. (citing WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 627 (3d ed. 1961); Farmer, 375 S.W.2d at
742).
137. CBI Indus., 860 S.W.2d at 665 (citing Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Alamo
Savings Ass'n, 611 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ)).
138. Id.
139. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
140. CBI Indus., 860 S.W.2d at 665.
141. Id. at 666.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 666-67.
145. The authors would like to thank the House Research Organization and the Senate
Research Center. Both organizations produce excellent legislative analyses, which they have
generously provided for this paper.
146. There was also environmental legislation affecting oil and gas operations. See Act of
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all statutes is August 30 or September 1, 1993.
A. WASTE DISPOSAL
1. Solid Waste
The Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act was amended to increase maximum
annual generation fees for hazardous and non-hazardous waste and maxi-
mum waste management fees for landfill waste. 147 The maximum annual
generation fee for the generation of industrial solid waste and hazardous
waste was increased from $25,000 to $50,000, and the maximum fee for the
generation of non-hazardous waste from $1,000 to $10,000.148 The waste
management fee for waste generated in the state was increased from $20 to
$40 per ton for waste that will be landfilled. 149 The legislation also instituted
new fees: (1) current hazardous and solid waste remediation fees now apply
to the commercial disposal of industrial solid waste, and (2) a management
fee is imposed on owners and operators of a waste storage, processing, or
disposal facility for industrial solid waste managed on site.' 50 Management
fees for the commercial disposal of a non-hazardous industrial solid waste
may not exceed twenty percent of the fee established for the disposal of a
hazardous waste by the same method of disposal.'
2. Municipal Solid Waste
a. Use of Land Over Municipal Solid Waste Landfills
House Bill 2537 prohibits the development of over one acre of a tract of
land unless soil tests have been conducted by a registered professional engi-
neer to determine whether any part of the tract overlies a closed municipal
solid waste landfill facility. 152 "Development" is defined as "an activity on
or related to real property that is intended to lead to the construction or
alteration of an enclosed structure for the use or occupation of people for a
commercial or public purpose or to the construction of residences for three
or more families."' 153
The engineer performing the test must provide notification of discovery of
May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 949, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4060 (Vernon) (to be codified
as Title 11 of the TEX. NATURAL RESOURCES CODE) (regulating the storage of hazardous
liquids in salt domes); Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 882, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
3508 (Vernon) (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. NATURAL RESOURCES CODE ANN.
§§ 89.002(a) & 89.011) (regarding owner/operator responsibility for well plugging); Act of
May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 810, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3233 (Vernon) (to be codified
as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 401.003, 401.411 & 401.415)
(regulating naturally occurring radioactive materials in oil and gas exploration).
147. Act of June 2, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 379, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1676 (Vernon)
(to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.131 et seq.).
148. Id. § 4, at 1678.
149. Id. § 5, at 1679.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Act of June 18, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 770, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3016
(Vernon) (to be codified at Chapter 361, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, Subchapter R).




closed municipal solid waste landfills to each owner and lessee of the tract,
the TNRCC, and local government officials with the authority to disapprove
an application for development. 154 If a closed municipal solid waste landfill
is discovered, in addition to the notification requirements, other require-
ments include: (a) deed recordation by the owner and local government offi-
cials who receive notice of the soil test results; (b) a prohibition on leasing
the property unless the development complies with these requirements; (c) at
new and existing structures, installation of monitors with automatic alarms
to detect methane gas generated by the landfill and structural modifications
to minimize the effects of the accumulation of methane gas; (d) a prohibition
on development unless the owner or lessee holds a permit issued by the
TNRCC; and (e) submission of a permit application to the TNRCC by the
owner or lessee at least forty-five days before development begins.1 55 Fi-
nally, a $10,000 fine may be imposed for each violation of these
requirements. 156
The TNRCC's interpretation of the bill is that it does not require testing
until the Agency promulgates implementing regulations. 157 Once effective,
the testing requirement may apply to practically any kind of development of
a tract of land that is greater than one acre, such as construction or expan-
sion of existing plant facilities, office buildings and apartments, and perhaps
for any other kind of construction other than residences for less than three
families. 158
The legislation has far-reaching implications. To the extent that testing
for closed municipal solid waste landfills becomes "customary" before ac-
quiring real property, the environmental investigation necessary for the "in-
nocent land owner" defense under the Federal Superfund Act and the Texas
Solid Waste Disposal Act will change as well.
b. Certification of Landfill Capacity to a Municipality
House Bill 130 requires owners of state or county-authorized solid waste
landfills to pre-certify that a landfill has sufficient capacity to accept munici-
pal waste that it would accept under any proposed contract with the city.159
If the landfill already has a municipal contract, it may not contract for waste
generated outside the city's extraterritorial jurisdiction in an amount that
would reduce the projected life of the landfill to less than the remainder of
the duration of the contract with the city. 160 The owner or operator, if re-
quested in writing, shall certify and report to the city annually the remaining
solid waste disposal capacity, the contractually committed volumes or ton-
154. Id. at 3018 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.538).
155. Id. at 3018-19 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.536-
361.539).
156. Id. at 3019 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.540).
157. Telephone interview with C. Talkington, Municipal Waste Division, Texas Natural
Resource Conservation Commission (Sept. 7, 1993).
158. Id.
159. Act of June 2, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S. ch. 400, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1701 (Vernon)
(to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.115).
160. Id. § 1, at 1701.
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nages of waste accepted, and an assurance the landfill can fulfill its disposal
commitment to the city.' 6 1
The bill was criticized as undercutting pending RCRA regulations pro-
moting regional landfill usage. Critics argued that, by hindering a landfill's
ability to accept waste from multiple municipalities, the bill would force cit-
ies to focus on a single landfill either by building a costly new one or finding
a new private contractor.1 62
c. Recycling Market Development
Senate Bill 1051163 requires the TNRCC to develop a strategic state solid
waste reduction plan for all solid waste under its jurisdiction. 164 Solid waste
disposal fees are now $1.25 per ton if the waste is measurable by weight; if
measured by volume, the fee is now forty cents per cubic yard for compacted
waste, and twenty-five cents per cubic yard for uncompacted waste. 165 The
operator of a public or privately owned municipal solid waste facility is enti-
tled to a refund of fifteen percent of solid waste fees for actively performing
composting operations and returning the composted materials to beneficial
reuse. 16 6 An operator is entitled to a twenty percent refund for voluntarily
banning the disposal of yard waste in addition to composting. 167 TNRCC
must also adopt rules establishing minimum standards and guidelines for the
issuance of permits for facilities that compost mixed stream municipal
waste.1 68 In addition, state agencies are required to expend a portion of
their consumable procurement budgets on materials that have recycled ma-
terial content.1 69
d. Municipal Solid Waste Management
Senate Bill 963 amended the Health and Safety Code to provide for a
strategic plan for the reduction of solid waste, a solid waste education pro-
gram, and an office of waste exchange. 17 0 The bill will fund local govern-
ment studies of rates that reflect the actual cost of services. 17' It also
restricts the authority of local governments to regulate solid waste in the
161. Id.
162. House Research Org., HB 130 Bill Analysis (4/28/93).
163. Act of June 19, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 899, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3562
(Vernon) (to be codified at Chapter 481, TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN., Subchapter AA).
164. Id. § 2.02, at 3569 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 361.020).
165. Id. § 1.08, at 3564 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 361.013 (a)).
166. Id. § 1.09, at 3565 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 361.035).
167. Id.
168. Id. § 1.13, at 3567 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 361.428).
169. Id. § 1.02, at 3563 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 601b).
170. Act of June 20, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 1045, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4465
(Vernon).




following ways:172 a local government or political subdivision cannot (1)
adopt an ordinance, rule or regulation to prohibit or restrict the sale or use
of a product, container or package for solid waste management purposes in a
manner that is not authorized by state law; (2) prohibit or restrict the
processing of solid waste by a solid waste facility except for such a facility
owned by the local government; or (3) assess a fee or deposit on the sale or
use of a container or package.
173
The legislation also requires the TNRCC to exempt from permit require-
ments certain waste transfer stations used to transfer municipal solid waste
to a disposal facility, including (1) those in cities with a population under
50,000, (2) those in counties with populations under 85,000, (3) facilities that
transfer 125 tons a day or less, or (4) materials recovery facilities that recycle
10% of their incoming non-segregated waste stream if the remaining nonre-
cyclable waste is transferred to a permitted landfill within 50 miles.
174
3. Low-Level Radioactive Waste
The federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, as amended in
1985, encourages states to form compacts to establish new low-level waste
disposal sites by providing that disposal facilities may be used exclusively by
the compacting states.' 75 Senate Bill 1206 established the Texas Low Level
Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact to be composed of the host state,
Texas, as well as Maine and Vermont. 176 The compact requires Texas to
develop, operate and maintain a facility to manage and dispose of low level
radioactive waste generated in the compact states.177 Texas is required to
develop a facility to manage or dispose of low level radioactive waste in a
timely manner and operate and maintain the facility after it stops accepting
additional waste.' 78 Maine and Vermont will contribute $25,000,000 each
to Texas, of which $2,500,000 will go to Hudspeth County, the disposal site,
for community assistance projects. 179
The Texas Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Authority was created
to select, construct, and operate a disposal facility for low-level radioactive
waste generated in Texas.' 80 H.B. 2318181 strengthens the role of the Citi-
zens Advisory Committee, which recommends how impact assistance money
should be allocated. The legislation also mandates a health surveillance
study in the vicinity of the disposal site, authorizes the Authority to sell and
172. Id. § 12, at 4470 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.0961).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 10, at 4469 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 361.111).
175. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(c) (West Supp. 1992).
176. Act of June 9, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 460, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1844 (Vernon)
(to be codified as Chapter 403 of the TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.).
177. Id. § 1, at 1847 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 4.01).
178. Id. (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 4.04).
179. Id. at 1849 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 5.01).
180. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE. ANN. § 402.011 (Vernon 1992).
181. Act of June 18, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 878, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3493
(Vernon) (effective June 18, 1993).
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lease surplus lands, and allows the Authority to construct facilities or public
projects in the area impacted by the disposal facility. 182 The legislation also
authorizes the Authority's board of directors to transfer money in the low
level waste fund to the county commissioners' court to be used to fund local
public projects, and establishes a ten percent surcharge on the planning and
implementation fee currently being collected from low level waste generators
in Texas. 183 The surcharge will be designated for local public projects.18 4
B. TNRCC PROCEDURES
1. Solid Waste Facility Permits
Senate Bill 639 amends solid waste facility permit application and notice
requirements. 8 5 Once an application is administratively complete, the
TNRCC may not revoke that determination. 186 The Commission can re-
quest additional information from the applicant only if the information is
necessary to clarify, modify, or supplement previously submitted material,
but the request for additional information cannot render the application in-
complete. t87 An additional permit application fee may not be assessed for
an industrial solid waste or hazardous waste draft permit that is returned for
further processing.188 The TNRCC is required to hold a public meeting on
an application for a new municipal solid waste management facility in the
county where the proposed facility is to be located.' 89 Substantial compli-
ance with the direct mail notice requirements required by § 361.081 of the
Health and Safety Code is sufficient for the Commission to exercise jurisdic-
tion over an application for a solid waste facility.' 90
2. Reduction of Administrative Penalties for Supplemental Environmental
Projects
H.B. 2429 authorizes the TNRCC to partially reduce administrative pen-
alties if the violator has undertaken eligible supplemental environmental
projects. 91 Credit against the penalty payment would be given for a portion
182. Id. (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 402.058, 402.094(d) &
402.220(c)-(e)).
183. Id. (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 402.252 & 402.2721).
184. Id.
185. Act of June 20, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 1044, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4463
(Vernon) (effective June 20, 1993).
186. Id. § 1, at 4463 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 361.068(b)).
187. Id.
188. Id. § 2, at 4463 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. 361.137(b)).
189. Id. § 3, at 4463 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 361.0791).
190. Id. § 4, at 4464 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 361.081(b)).
191. Act of June 8, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 551, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2058 (Vernon)
(effective June 8, 1993) (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.251(v),
361.252(o) & 382.088(j) and as an amendment to TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.136(n)).
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of the cost of appropriate projects. 192 Supplemental environmental projects
are projects that are TNRCC-approved and benefit the community that suf-
fered harm. 193 Eligible projects would prevent pollution, reduce pollutants
into the environment, enhance environmental quality, or contribute to envi-
ronmental public education, but do not include necessary action for compli-
ance or remediation. 194
C. WATER
Traditional Texas groundwater law has been governed by the rule of cap-
ture. 195 Under the rule of capture, landowners have the right to take for use
or sale all the water they can take from underneath their land. The rule of
capture has been recently challenged on two fronts: in rulemaking by the
Texas Water Commission and in a federal lawsuit to protect endangered
species. The Texas Legislature responded to those challenges with two new
statutes during the survey period.
1. TNRCC Authority to Regulate Groundwater
In April 1992, the Texas Water Commission declared the Edwards Aqui-
fer an "underground river" and its waters to be State water, and thus, sub-
ject to commission regulations.' 9 6 The commission immediately adopted
emergency rules and a moratorium on new wells tapping the Aquifer.
197
Suit was brought in state district court to challenge the rules and the plain-
tiffs were granted a summary judgment declaring the rules void. 198 The Leg-
islature reacted to the new rules by enacting S.B. 1334,199 which mooted
McFadin. S.B. 1334 restricts the Commission's rulemaking authority over
underground water to preserving water quality.2°° The Commission and its
successor, the TNRCC, may not regulate the quantity of groundwater used.
2. Management of the Edwards Aquifer and Protection of Endangered
Species
In May 1991, the Sierra Club filed a lawsuit against the U. S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (USFWS), based on the federal Endangered Species Act.20 1
The suit asked the USFWS to insure minimum spring flow from the Ed-
192. Id. § 1-4, at 2058-59.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 1935);
Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 26 (Tex. 1978); City of
Sherman v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983).
196. 17 TEX. REG. 2913 (1992) (emerg. rule 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 298.1-298.6,
298.11-298.13, 298.41-298.48) (Tex. Water Comm'n).
197. Id.
198. McFadin v. Texas Water Comm'n, No. 92-05214 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 33 1st
Judicial Dist. of Tex., Oct. 2, 1992).
199. Act of June 19, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 914, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3878
(Vernon) (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 28.011).
200. Id.




wards Aquifer to protect endangered species that could be affected by aqui-
fer flow. U. S. District Judge Lucius Bunton ruled in favor of the Sierra
Club and ordered that spring flow must be maintained, that the Texas Water
Commission must submit a plan to the court by March 1, 1993 to insure that
Comal and San Marcos springs will not drop below jeopardy levels, and that
the Legislature must enact a regulatory system to limit withdrawals from the
Edwards Aquifer by May 31, 1993.202
In response to the Judge's ruling, the Texas Legislature enacted S.B.
1477.203 The bill created the Edwards Aquifer Authority with the power to
regulate underground water within the boundaries of the Edwards Aquifer
as described in the bill and with the power of eminent domain. 2°4 The Au-
thority is charged with all of the power provided to a local government to
prevent pollution and enforce water quality standards within its jurisdiction
and a buffer zone. 20 5 The Authority is authorized to hold permits under
state law or the Federal Endangered Species Act and to execute contracts. 206
The bill established pumping limits for the region. 207 Water may not be
withdrawn without obtaining a permit from the Authority. 208 The Author-
ity also has the power to regulate permits, manage all well construction and
withdrawal from the Aquifer, and take action to insure compliance with all
permitting, metering, and reporting requirements. 20 9 Existing users may ap-
ply for an initial regular permit by filing a declaration of historical use. 210
The Authority may issue additional regular permits on the basis of availabil-
ity after it issues all existing user permits 21 1. Violations could result in ad-
ministrative penalties between $100 and $1000 per violation per day. 21 2 The
Authority may also file a civil action for an injunction to enforce the provi-
sions of this bill 213 for a civil penalty of between $100 and $10,000 per viola-
tion per day, and to recover reasonable attorneys' fees. 214
3. Non-Point Source Pollution from Agricultural Activities
SB 502 and SB 503 designate the State Soil and Water Conservation
Board as the lead agency for the State for programs regarding agricultural or
silvacultural non-point source pollution. 21 5 The Board is made up of five
202. Id.
203. Act of June 11, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 626, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2353
(Vernon) (effective date of September 1, 1993, except that § 1.35 (prohibiting a person from
withdrawing water from the aquifer except as authorized by a permit) takes effect March 1,
1994).
204. Id.
205. Id. § 1.08, at 2359.
206. Id. § 1.11, at 2361.
207. Act of June 11, 1993 § 1.14, at 2362.
208. Id. §§ 1.15, 1.35 at 2363, 2369.
209. Id. § 1.11, at 2361.
210. Id. § 1.16 at 2363.
211. Id. § 1.18, at 2364.
212. Id. § 1.37, at 2369.
213. Id. § 1.38, at 2371.
214. Id. § 1.40, at 2371.
215. Act of April 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 53, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 116 (Vernon)
(to be codified as an amendment to TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.0135(a)-(d) & (h); Act of
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members- all elected from soil and water conservation districts by adults or
family farm corporations holding title to or living on farm or ranch lands.2 16
S.B. 502 provides that regional assessments involving agricultural or
silvacultural non-point source pollution are to be coordinated through the
Board with local soil and water conservation districts. 2 17 S.B. 503 autho-
rizes the board to set up a water quality plan certification program for devel-
opment, approval, and certification of water quality management plans for
agricultural and silvacultural lands. 21 8 The bill also establishes the cost
share assistance program to reimburse farm owners or operators for up to
seventy-five percent of the costs of implementing soil and water conservation
land improvement measures. 21 9 To be eligible under the cost sharing pro-
gram, a pollution prevention project would have to be "consistent with the
purposes of controlling erosion, conserving water, or protecting water qual-
ity. ' '220 Other state agencies are required to coordinate with the Board on
any abatement programs and activities, but the TNRCC would continue to
be the lead agency in matters relating to the state's overall participation in
the federal national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES). 22,
D. CHEMICAL RIGHT-TO-KNOW LEGISLATION
In 1985, Texas enacted the Hazard Communication Act, establishing
worker and community rights to know about the nature and effects of chem-
icals used by employers and other businesses in their communities. 222 Re-
porting and record keeping requirements were based on an impending
OSHA Hazard Communication Standard. The OSHA standards for worker
right to know were to apply only to manufacturers, so the state standard was
worded to cover only public employers and certain other non-
manufacturers.
Since then, the federal worker right to know law has been expanded to all
businesses, and the community right to know law has also been broadened.
Because federal OSHA standards pre-empt Texas regulations, much of the
worker right to know law in the state had no effect on any group other than
public employers. H.B. 1431 amended the Texas Health and Safety Code to
conform state right to know provisions to federal law. 223 The most contro-
versial aspect of the bill was that it increased reporting thresholds for haz-
ardous chemicals from 500 pounds or 55 gallons to the federal threshold of
10,000 pounds for chemicals other than those classified as extremely hazard-
April 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 54, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 117 (Vernon) (to be codified
at Chapter 201, TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN., Subchapter I and § 201.026).
216. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 201.011 (Vernon 1982).
217. Act of April 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 53, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 116 (Vernon).
218. Act of April 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 54, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 117 (Vernon)
(to be codified as an amendment to TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 201.026(c)).
219. Id. § 2, at 118 (to be codified at TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 201.301-201.311).
220. Id. (to be codified at TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 201.302).
221. Id. § 1, at 117 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN.
§ 201.026(a)).
222. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. ch. 502 (Vernon 1992).
223. Act of June 8, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 528, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1974 (Vernon).
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ous, which are reportable at 500 pounds.224
1. Worker Right to Know Provisions
The bill clarifies that state worker right to know provisions apply only to
public employers. 225 Instead of annual education and training sessions on
chemicals, the new provision stipulates that employee training will be pro-
vided as often as an employer deems necessary. 226 Employers must report
accidents involving chemical exposures or asphyxiation within forty-eight
hours of the occurrence if it is fatal to an employee or results in the hospitali-
zation of five or more employees.227 The Health Department director may
also assess administrative penalties against a public employer for violating
the law or board rules or orders. These penalties are capped at $500 per day
for a violation. 228 Civil penalties are capped at $2,000 per day for each vio-
lation up to a total of $20,000 each; criminal penalties are punishable by a
fine of not more than $10,000 per violation per day up to $100,000.229 The
award of a civil or criminal penalty does not affect the rights of an employee
or other employer to recover damages under any other law. 230
2. Community Right to Know Provisions
Except for fees and penalties, the community right to know provisions are
generally identical for manufacturers, public employers, and non-manufac-
turing facilities. Facility operators covered by the law are required to com-
pile, maintain, and submit to the Health Department information on
hazardous chemicals present in the facility that exceed thresholds estab-
lished by the EPA.23 ' Citizens may now request copies of workplace chemi-
cal lists directly from the manufacturer or public employer rather than the
Health Department. 232 Non-manufacturing employers would not be re-
quired to allow direct citizen access. 233 Fire department representatives may
conduct on-site inspections of reportable chemicals for the purpose of emer-
gency planning.234 The Health Department may enter a facility at reason-
able times for spot checks or to investigate complaints. 235
224. Id. § 2, at 1990 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 505.006).
225. Id. § 1, at 1976 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 502.003).
226. Id. at 1981 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 502.009).
227. Id. at 1982 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 502.012).
228. Act of June 8, 1993, § 1, at 1983 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 502.014).
229. Id. at 1985 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 502.015-016).
230. Id.
231. Id. § 2, at 1990 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 505.006).
232. Id. at 1990 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 505.007).
233. Id.
234. Act of June 8, 1993, § 2, at 1991 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 505.008).
235. Id. at 1991 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 505.009).
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If a violation is found, the Department may assess administrative penalties
of $500 per day for violations up to a cap of $5,000 for each violation by
manufacturers; for public employers and non-manufacturers, the penalty
would be $50 per day up to $1,000.236 Manufacturing and public employers
are subject to civil penalties of up to $5,000 for knowingly disclosing false
information or negligently failing to disclose the hazard as required. 237 A
criminal penalty of up to $25,000 is also possible when the false disclosure or
negligence proximately caused an occupational disease or injury.238 Non-
manufacturing employers would not be subject to civil or criminal penalties.
The bill also allows the Board of Health to collect annual filing fees from
facility operators. 239
E. AIR
1. The Texas Clean Air Act
In July, 1992 the EPA published final rules to implement Title V of the
1990 Federal Clean Air Act Amendments. 24° Title V requires states to de-
velop operating permit programs. House Bill 2049 amends the Texas Clean
Air Act to bring the state into compliance with the requirements of Title V
by giving the state adequate statutory authority to issue permits and promul-
gate rules that demonstrate the state's permit program complies with federal
requirements. 24 1 The Texas Clean Air Act provisions enacted in 1991 to
implement the federal Clean Air Act Amendments were based on the as-
sumption that Texas' pre-construction permits would be rolled into the fed-
erally-mandated operating permit so sources would eventually have only one
permit. House Bill 2049, however, provides for a two permit system: pre-
construction permits and Title V operating permits co-exist as separate
programs. 242
The legislation provides for permit conditions of general applicability by
rule. 243 It includes provisions for the reopening or revision of federal operat-
ing permits, notice and public hearing requirements, exemptions for certain
federal sources from obtaining a federal operating permit, and provisions for
revocations and permit exemptions. 2 " It also contains a conflict of interest
provision providing that the executive director of the board may not issue a
236. Id. at 1991 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 505.010).
237. Id. at 1993 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 505.013).
238. Id. at 1993 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 505.014).
239. Id. at 1993 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 505.016).
240. See Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250 (1992) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. Part 70).
241. Act of June 9, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 485, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1888 (Vernon)
(effective June 9, 1993, except § 25 (striking provision in TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 382.0622 (b) that unexpended money in the clean air fund at the end of each biennium shall
be transferred to the general revenue fund) effective September 1, 1993).
242. Id. § 7, at 1890 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 382.0511(a) & (c)).
243. Id. § 8 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 382.0513).
244. Id. § 10-27, at 1891-1902 .(to be codified as an amendment to Chapter 382, TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.).
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permit for a solid waste incineration unit if any member of the board or the
executive director was responsible for the design, construction, or operation
of the unit.245 The bill also provides that an increase in annual operating
hours is not considered a modification of a permit. 246
2. Area Emission Reduction Credit Organizations
In non-attainment areas for ozone (Houston, Beaumont, Dallas and El
Paso), the Federal Clean Air Act limits new construction and expansion of
industrial facilities.247 A company that wants to construct or expand must
produce emissions offsets in an amount greater than the amount of new air
pollution that it will create. Senate Bill 513 authorized the creation of re-
gional organizations called Area Emission Reduction Credit Organiza-
tions.248 The purpose of these organizations would be to acquire air
pollution offsets to use for economic development in the nonattainment
areas. 249
F. MISCELLANEOUS
1. Exemption from Ad Valorem Taxes for Pollution Control
House Bill 1920250 was contingent on the passage of a constitutional
amendment, House Joint Resolution 86, which was approved by the votes on
November 2, 1993. The bill provides for an exemption from ad valorem
taxes. 251 Property used, constructed, acquired, or installed wholly or partly
to meet or exceed rules or regulations adopted by any environmental protec-
tion agency of the United States or Texas, or a political subdivision of Texas,
for the prevention, monitoring, control, or reduction of air, water, or land
pollution is exempt.2 52 One seeking the tax exemption must apply to the
Executive Director of the TNRCC, who then sends a copy of the application
to the Chief Appraiser for the county where the property is located. 253 If the
Executive Director determines that the facility, device, or method is used
wholly or partly to control pollution, he then issues a letter to that effect. 254
The Executive Director's determination is conclusive.
2. Liability Caps for Coastal Oil Spills
Senate bill 1049 amends the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of
245. Id. § 22, at 1899 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 382.0591).
246. Id. § 4, at 1889 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. 382.003(9)(D).
247. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (West 1983 and Supp. 1993).
248. Act of May 11, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 128, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 276 (Vernon)
(to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. ch. 384).
249. Id. § 1, at 277 (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 384.002).
250. Act of May 25, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 285, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1324
(Vernon).
251. Id. § 1, at 1324 (to be codified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.31).
252. Id. at 1325 (to be codified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.31(b)).
253. Id. (to be codified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.31(c)).
254. Id. (to be codified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.31(d)).
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1991 to cap liability for natural resource damage from coastal oil spills. 255 It
limits the total liability for all natural resource damages for an actual or
threatened spill from tank vessels, other vessels, and terminal facilities. 25 6 If
the spill resulted, however, from gross negligence or misconduct, or from a
violation of federal or state safety, construction, or operating regulations, the
person responsible would be liable for the full amount of all damages to
natural resources. 257 In addition, it requires the owner of a terminal facility
or vessel to maintain evidence of financial responsibility. 25 8
3. Exempting Units of Local Government from Superfund Liability as
Subsequent Owners
Senate Bill 570 exempts local governments from the definition of poten-
tially responsible parties under the state Superfund statute.259 It provides
that a political subdivision, or an officer or employee of the political subdivi-
sion, is not a person responsible for solid waste released or threatened to be
released from a facility or site if the political subdivision acquired ownership
or control through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other cir-
cumstances in which the subdivision involuntarily acquired title by virtue of
the subdivision's function as sovereign. 260
4. Preempting Local Government Regulation of Pesticides
Senate Bill 609261 amends the Agriculture Code and the Texas Structural
Pest Control Act, in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier.262 In Mortier, the Court held that
local governments may pass stricter regulations than state and federal codes
for the regulation of pesticides.263 Senate Bill 609 prohibits cities, towns,
counties, or other political subdivisions of the state from adopting any ordi-
nance, rule, or regulation regarding pesticide sale or use. 264
255. Act of June 17, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 776, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3032
(Vernon).
256. Id. § 9, at 3039 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 40.203).
257. Id.
258. Id. § 8, at 3038 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 40.201).
259. Act of May 16, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 159, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 313 (Vernon)
(effective May 16, 1993) (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 361.271).
260. Id. § 1, at 314.
261. Act of May 7, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 96, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 185 (Vernon)
(effective May 7, 1993).
262. 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991).
263. Id. at 2479.
264. Act of May 7, 1993 (to be codified at TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 76.101(d) and TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1356-6, § II-C (Vernon 1987).
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